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The right to privacy has attracted attention for at least a cen-
tury in the United States on account of the lack of direct protection
it has received by the content of municipal law. Over these years
this attention has turned into deeper and deeper concern corre-
sponding to the gravity of danger into which notions of privacy
have been exposed. Indeed, at the moment of writing this narra-
tive, the United States Senate, through one of its subcommittees,
seems to be examining at least one particular aspect of the on-
slaughts on the privacy of an individual by the process of
computers. 1
While the matter clearly remains deserving of serious attention
at the level of domestic law, quite unexpectedy it has received valu-
able support from the domain of international human rights law.
Recent court adjudications have suddenly given impetus to a new
line of argument: that in appropriate situations, with imaginative
approaches, municipal forums can profitably utilize international
norms to provide fresh aid and support for this endangered right to
privacy.
If case law on these lines can develop, it is possible that not
only domestic notions of a right to privacy will be further matured,
but international dimensions of this matter will attain sharper fo-
cus. It is important to realize that internationally also efforts
should be accelerated to deal with this problem. If privacy has to
be guaranteed, transnational interferences no less than domestic
ones, must be effectively checked.
International human rights law is now in its third generation.'
Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. Of Lincoln's Inn, Barris-
ter of Law; Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Member, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, London; Member of the Oregon Bar.
I. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at 1, col. I.
2. The human rights of the first generation are said to be civil and political in nature,
while that of the second generation are directed towards economic, social and cultural
matters.
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Indeed in the last few years efforts at the international level have
been progressing to create more, but somewhat complex, kinds of
human rights.3 But while this has been occurring, it is somewhat
surprising that the right to privacy, clearly acknowledged as far
back as 1948, has received scant attention at the international level.
The following discussion, inter alia, will highlight the point
that as both consciously and unconsciously modern society's reli-
ance on science and technology has produced a massive interfer-
ence in the privacy of an individual, there has also taken place a
growing realization in countries like the United States that the
norms of the law should also protect one's privacy from intrusions
which have taken place as a consequence of such mechanisms. As a
result of this realization there has been manifestly a movement in
evidence, though not very successful, to extend, as and when re-
quired, the guarantees of the law to protect a person from newer
kinds of invasions of his private life.4 The use of the word "extend"
should be noted. We will soon see that the domestic constitutional
systems like that of the United States generally speaking do not
directly address the question of privacy stricti sensu. As such,
courts and juristic efforts have contributed to the enlargement of the
protections given by other rights, which are directly recognized by
the domestic law to cater for newer kinds of invasions of privacy.
In contradistinction to this municipal position, for example, of
3. The present third generation of human rights deals with more complex types of
protections to be offered to the people particularly as a consequence of the establishment of
the New International Economic Order. See, e.g., UNESCO, Experts Report, Rapporteur,
Peter O'Brien (SS-78/CONF. 630/COL. 2). In 1980, UNESCO engaged international
human rights experts for presenting theses on new human rights. The new set of human
rights examined were: (I) the right to communicate; (2) the right to be different; (3) the right
to environmental; (4) the right to peace; (5) the right to development; and, (6) the right to
common heritage of mankind. This author was assigned the task of devising the second of
the rights mentioned above. See UNESCO, SS/CONF-806/Col. 7.
4. For the most recent debate on this question see Senators to Examine Official Use of
Computor Data on Individuals: Hearings by the Oversight Subcomm. on Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The purpose of these
hearings are summed up by the following passage in the report:
More than 200 Federal and state projects are using computers to examine the
names, addresses and other information about millions of Americans, looking for
waste of public funds and a variety of criminal activities.
A broad range of politicians, business executives, agency officials and public inter-
est groups say the projects save taxpayers money and improve public administra-
tion. Others question the efficiency, ethics and long-term impact of at least some of
the programs, including those involving the Internal Revenue Service.
The Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
will hold hearings this week on the growing number of computer matching projects,
as they are called, and their effect on both individual freedoms and government
efficiency.
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the United States, it will be seen that internationally, the right to
privacy is specifically acknowledged. It will be later discussed that
when the post-World War II human rights developments began,
inter alia, by the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration), the right to privacy was indeed
mentioned by this famous international instrument.
Since subsequent international developments in the evolution
of human rights did little to project this matter, it might be con-
cluded, that possibly, it was not considered altogether urgent to do
so with great fervor of dedication. Or perhaps, similar to the
domestic field, it might have been the unconscious feeling that
other existing rights could solve the kinds of problems which this
right could possibly redress. Or could the real reason for neglecting
this matter be ignorance? The manner in which privacy has been
gradually invaded during the last thirty years might never have
been realized.5
At the outset one important point about this matter must be
emphasized: privacy, both domestically as well as internationally,
as a desirable human goal, is definitely in the category of "endan-
gered species." It will be submitted in this short presentation that
scientific progress coupled with increasing governmental and insti-
tutional control over the individual have so much eroded concep-
tions of privacy that unless: (1) the gravity of the situation is
recognized internationally (and of course nationally), and (2) ap-
propriate measures are taken to alleviate the problem, the interna-
tional legal system (like the municipal ones) will increasingly
become powerless to safeguard some fundamental aspects of an in-
dividual's life. In this context it will be argued that one method of
protecting privacy domestically is through the use of international
norms dealing with this subject.
With regard to the invasions of the privacy of Americans by
computers and machines, the Director of the Washington Office of
American Civil Liberties Union, in a very recent report, stated:
Conducting huge fishing expeditions into personal files, using
them for purposes wholly unrelated to why the files were initially
5. Id. at 14, col. 1.
Among civil libertarians, the worry is that computer matching is gradually eroding
the ethical values expressed by the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution. These provisions protect citizens' rights to free speech and to freedom
from improperly intrusive Government activities, and some critics believe that the
protection is weakened by computer examination of the records of large groups of
people, most of whom are not guilty of any wrongdoing.
Vol. 13
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collected and working on the basic assumption that people must
prove their innocence of wrongdoing if their name appears in a
computer printout is an assault on the most basic concept of per-
sonal privacy and freedom.6
While this paper will not provide any tangible answers of how to
remove this peculiar deprivation of human freedom, it will stress
that in appropriate domestic cases, efforts may be made to redress
the underlying problems by using international norms in municipal
forums. It will be suggested to call in aid, or simply incorporate,
the normative international law on the point by the enforcement-
remedial process of domestic systems of States.
This suggestion is essentially based on an awareness that inter-
national enforcement procedures in any case are difficult to create
and may not be the best solution (under the present setup of inter-
national realities) to deal with the kinds of problems we want to
solve. In particular, the somewhat imprecise nature of protection
required by the individual under this right may be better served by
domestic forums. Furthermore, as any infringement of privacy will
usually occur within the territorial jurisdiction of a country, most
likely in an area which is on the "penumbra" of one or several
domestically protected rights, municipal forums may be better
equipped to deal with the situation.7
. In this context two recent domestic United States cases will be
seen which have made use of this technique to aid notions of human
privacy, dignity and decency as contained in international texts while
deciding domestic controversies. It should also be noted at the be-
ginning that while lawyers are not too comfortable with labels such
as "dignity" and "decency," this is a field where this must be done.
Ex hypothesi, these are the very matters, abstract as they might ap-
pear on first glimpse, which a right to privacy will be directed to
protect.
6. Id. at 14, col. 2. Similarly, President Nixon, in an address to the nation, is reported
to have said:
What a person earns, what he owes, what he gives to his church or to his charity is
his own personal business and should not be spread around without his consent
. . . When personal information is given or obtained for one purpose such as a loan
or credit at a store, it should not be secretly used by anyone for any other purpose.
Id at 14, col. 3.
7. "Penumbra," as a term, was used by Justice Douglas in Grirwold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483, 485 [hereinafter cited as Griswold]. Griswold concerned the use of contracep-
tives by married people; the Court stuck down the law forbidding such use.
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I. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
As already indicated the premier source of a right to privacy in
the international sphere is the Universal Declaration. To that we
shall turn to shortly, but it is well to point out that it is not really
possible to project the true scope of this right at the international
level within the limited field envisaged by this Article. But that is
not to say that even with larger ambitions, it would be easy to do so
either domestically or transnationally. At least that much will be-
come clear in the next section of this Article.
The right to privacy was mentioned in the Universal Declara-
tion, along with a number of other matters. Article 12 of the Decla-
ration reads as follows: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or corresponding, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."'
Before turning our attention to the right to privacy, which is
protected by this article, it will be helpful to briefly comment on the
other protections called for by this provision. It will be apparent
that the protection of home and correspondence will be readily
found to exist in the laws (even if not in practice) of most States.
Usually, both constitutional law as well as diverse rules of criminal
law protect such spheres. The matter of family by law may differ
from State to State as well as the notion of what constitutes a fam-
ily. The question of reputation and honor is not very bothersome
as it would normally be protected by both the law of torts as well as
in some cases by the criminal law. That leaves us with the concept
of privacy.
The extent to which various aspects of privacy may be reme-
died by the other rights mentioned in article 12 (or by other arti-
cles) of the Universal Declaration need not be examined. We will
later see that while discussing this subject there is great advantage
in being flexible on this point. But conceding that certain aspects of
what constitutes privacy could be dealt with by other internation-
ally proclaimed or protected rights, what is it which, stricti sensu,
can be emphasized to constitute the core of a right to privacy?
What is, essentially, the foundation of this right?
A short answer to this question will be provided in a moment.
8. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 GAOR (A/810) at 71-77, reprinted in L. SOHN & T.
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However, it must be added that the manner in which this is being
done here is not necessarily the only way of approaching this prob-
lem. It is possible, depending upon one's perspectives and goals, to
argue that this right is grounded on diverse premises.
But with this preface, it is submitted that while existing tabula-
tion of rights usually found in constitutional texts aim to provide
guarantees against encroachment of specific types by the State
against an individual's freedom of actions, and to protect his person
or property, this right is really concerned with ensuring that the
dignity of man is not violated. Admittedly, it can be argued that
the concept of "dignity" might itself be as vague or abstract as that
of privacy. But, as we shall soon see, it appears that by virtue of
two recent court decisions (and, of course, some earlier ones), it is
possible to justifiably contend that the right to privacy is indeed
deriving a major or substantial part of its genesis from what in civi-
lized societies we designate by notions of "dignity" and "decency."
In essence, a right to privacy will keep such considerations sacro-
sanct for an individual.
That considerations such as these really constitute the heart of
the concept of privacy can be seen by examining the language of
article 12 quoted above. While separately each of the other matters
needing protection, as already submitted, is usually specifically cov-
ered by diverse rules of domestic laws, we obtain a more clear idea
about privacy, at least as conceived by this clause, by looking at the
totality of the protection article 12 envisages. The five particular
matters which must be .safeguarded against "arbitrary interference"
after privacy are said to be: family, home, correspondence, honor
and reputation. It would seem that not only does privacy precede
the other five requiring protection, but in many ways it guides us to
see the philosophical basis of this entire provision.
Quite clearly the protection being advocated is not in respect
of the common variety of private interests that civilized legal sys-
tems generally protect. The traditional list of such protected inter-
ests consists of the integrity of the person and property of an
individual together with other matters which progressively develop-
ing societies came to accept as deserving of sanctity. In this cate-
gory, matters such as reputation, intellect and spiritual predilictions
were given a protected status. But what domestic legal systems gen-
erally did not do, or even try to accomplish, was to evolve directly a
comprehensive legal theory or apparatus to allow an individual
complete mastery over information which pertains to his own af-
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fairs-provided of course that no infringement of the law was in-
volved. In other words, an opportunity to be left alone or secure
from the scrutiny or gaze of outsiders in all matters (consisting of
information about him) in which they had no concern is not pro-
vided. When viewed in this light it appears reasonable to submit
that mention of the immediate surroundings of an individual (i.e.,
his home, family, and honor) clearly meant to convey the message
of affording him, in his own habitat, an inviolable position.
In this context two further points need attention. First, the in-
violability described above was placed by this provision only at the
level of "arbitrary interference." In other words, this protection
was subject to lawful and reasonable control and regulation by the
State. Second, mention of matters such as family and honor mani-
festly emphasize the intimate nature of relationships that an indi-
vidual may have which were to be accorded security of protection.
In sum, the privacy which this provision meant to protect was to
extend to all personal and intimate information that every individ-
ual, regardless of his status in life, possesses. Conversely, if outsid-
ers acquired information of this kind about an individual, he would
invariably be placed in a position of indignity - at least from the
perspective of the individual.
II. RIGHT TO PRIVACY: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
We can now briefly advert to the problem of lexicography
pointed out above, i.e., unless the scope of the undertaking is truly
exhaustive, even in domestic systems, it is difficult to encompass the
definition, extent and scope of a right to privacy.
One of the most illustrative depictions of this matter can be
seen by looking at the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitu-
tion. Prime facie, it will be seen that this most famous of docu-
ments of its kind does not mention a right to privacy. While
assaults of various kinds on the person or property (including repu-
tation) find laws in their path, the prerogative of an individual to be
left alone about his feelings and thoughts, or to keep information
about himself away from others-as long as directly or indirectly
no law is infringed-is not directly acknowledged.
In view of this fact the judges in this country, in some cases,
attempted to safeguard some hithertofore unprotected spheres of an
individual's personal existence by extending the halo of acknowl-
edged guarantees. In the context of our discussion perhaps the
Vol. 13254
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most well known case of this category is Griswold v. Connecticut.9
In this case Justice Douglas, inter alia, said:
Various guarantees create zones ofprivacy. The right of associa-
tion contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is anotherfacet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone ofprivacy which government may not force him to sur-
render to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparge others retained by the people.' 0
Justice Douglas then referred to other cases'' and writings 12
and concluded that "the present case, then, concerns a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees."' 3 It is thus clearly manifest that without
defining privacy, the protection of certain private aspects of a per-
9. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
10. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
11. Id. For the fourth and fifth amendments the Court referred to Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, which provided protection against all governmental invasions "of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Other cases considered were: Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 644; Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; Lanza v. N. Y., 370 U.S. 139;
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360; and, Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535.
12. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. The Court referred to Beaney, The Constitutional Right
to Privacy, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 212 and Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 216 (1960).
13. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. While referring to the Boyd case, the Court reiterated in
a note its opinion therein:
The principles laid down in this opinion [by Lord Camden in Entick v. Car-
rington, 19 How St Tr 1029] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence,-it is the invasion of
this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances
of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgement. In this regard the
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son's life was extracted from the "penumbra" of specified guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, while a right to privacy does
find mention in the case law, we do not have a direct acknowledg-
ment of it in the Constitution of the United States. 4 Nevertheless,
we do have in the United States several cases, particularly from the
domain of constitutional and criminal law, which indicate or iden-
tify the situations where this right might apply.' 5
A brief look historically at the right of privacy would show
that the subject had attracted the attention of earlier writers and
authorities long before most of the cases referred to in Griswold.
Perhaps the most important of such accounts is an article by Sa-
muel Warren and Louis Brandeis, entitled The Right to Privacy,
written in December of 1890 and published in the Harvard Law
Review.' 6 Apparently, Warren had been upset at reports published
about him by the press and wanted to stress the need to be "let
alone." For example, the article states:
That the individual shall havefullprotection in person and prop-
erty is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to defne anew the exact nature
and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law,
in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Thus,
in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical in-
terference with life and property . . . . Later, there came a rec-
ognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.
Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy lfe,-the right to
14. While the Federal Constitution does not mention this right, it is mentioned in state
constitutions. See, e.g., art. 1, § I of the California constitution which states: "All people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." This section was added November 5, 1974. See
also Behr, Privacy: To Be Or Not To Be, That Is The Question, 10 PAC. L.J. 633 1979;
Alexander & Spurgeon, Privacy, Banking Records and the Supreme Court. A Before AndAfter
Look at Miller, 10 Sw. L. REV. 13 (1978); Bryant, Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-4
Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1211 (1980); Comment, The Relational
Right Of Privacy, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 92 (1956); Comment, Constitutional Limitations Upon
Congressional Investigations, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 645, 653 (1958); Note, In re Scott K.: The
Juvenile's Right to Privacy in the Home, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 783 (1980).
15. Some other important cases dealing with the right to privacy are Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ("reasonable expectation of privacy") and Rakus v. Ill., 439 U.S.
128 (1978) ("legitimate expectation of privacy"). The leading electronic surveillance case is
fifteen years old. Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See also cases cited supra notes
9 and 11. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978).
16. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Vol. 13
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be let alone, the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive
civil privileges, and the term 'roperty" has grown to comprise
every form ofpossession - intangible, as well as tangible. 17
A sound prophesy as to the means which might be used to invade
the privacy of a person (in the sense described above) were de-
scribed to be:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to
be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enter-
prise have in vaded the sacredprecincts ofprivate and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the pre-
diction that "What is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops. ' ' 18
We accordingly attain a glimpse of the methods, which as far back
as the last century, were considered potentially employable to take
from a person the private aspects of his life. That this kind of at-
tack was an affront to the dignity, spirituality and intellect of people
in civilized societies was, perhaps, the underlying justification for
having such a right considered worthy of protection by the law at
the municipal level.
From this brief resume we can state at least the following four
conclusions about this right in the domestic law of the United
States:
(1) The right to privacy is not directly mentioned by the Con-
stitution of the United States.
(2) Nevertheless, privacy is referred to by numerous cases
which without defining it state that the source of this protection lies
in the "penumbra" or the "zones of protection" of different consti-
tutional rights.
(3) While being based on the notions of a civilized society re-
garding the "dignity" of the individual, 9 its exact parameters were
left undefined; this was clearly done consciously as to allow its ap-
plication whenever necessary, without being bogged down by rigid
lines of precedents or lexicography.
(4) The invasions of an individual's privacy were identified as
coming from newer inventions by which the public or the State
17. Id.
18. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
19. Warren and Brandeis further observed that "the common law secures to each indi-
vidual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions shall be communicated to others." Id. at 198.
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could acquire information which was the individual's right to keep
to himself. The right to privacy was indeed said to be the same
thing as the right to be left alone.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the wisdom of earlier authori-
ties leads us to shy away from undertaking a comprehensive lexico-
graphical task of expounding in detail what this right covers or may
cover in the international field. We will have a fair idea of what
needs attention in the future if we realize (1) what needs protection
(the right of an individual to keep to himself what he does not want
others to see or know about him since it pertains to his person or his
private matters) 2° and, (2) from what quarters the invasion is likely
to come (through new inventions of science and technology).
A. International Human Rights Law and the Right to Privacy
After this brief survey of the position of this right to privacy in
the domestic case law of the United States, we can revert to the
discussion of this subject in the field of international law.
The foremost point to notice is that, perhaps, here is a rare case
where the normative content of a particular human right appears to
be more clearly supported by a leading international text of high
authority2' than by the provisions of the constitutional law of a
country. Indeed, the country we are speaking of is no other than
the one which gave birth to the idea of having fundamental human
20. This still covers a large field even if one takes away the few cases where States might
impinge on privacy for matters of national security or crime prevention. While addressing
such matters, Senator William S. Cohen, Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs said:
Computer matching offers an excellent opportunity for the government to crack
down on waste and fraud . . . . But there must be a proper safeguard to protect
against an unwarranted invasion of privacy. I am hopeful these hearings will pro-
vide an opportunity to discuss what the proper balance between these two concerns
should be.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
21. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res/ 217(111). U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948). See also Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
International and National Law, 53 A.S.I.L. Proc. 217 (1959). The following United Nations
report states:
During the years since its adoption the Declaration has come, through its influence
in a variety of contexts, to have a marked impact on the pattern and content of
international law and to acquire a status extending beyond that originally intended
for it. In general, two elements may be distinguished in this process: first, the use
of the Declaration as a yardstick by which to measure the content and standard of
observance of human rights; and, second, the reaffirmation of the Declaration and
its provisions in a series of other instruments. These two elements, often to be
found combined, have caused the Declaration to gain a cumulative and pervasive
effect.
The Secretary General, 1971 Survey of International Law (A/CN.4/245, at 196).
Vol. 13
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freedoms incorporated into its Constitution some two hundred
years ago. As such, while domestic decisions, some of which were
referred to earlier, have had to argue to find support for this right in
the confines of other directly recognized guarantees, we have in the
international field a clear acknowledgment of this particular
matter.
And this is important since the two cases which form the un-
derlying basis for writing this short Article have commendably but-
tressed their rulings by also referring to, admittedly in a supporting
role, the clear acceptance of notions of individual privacy, dignity
and fairness as found in texts of an international character. As
these judicial developments occur at a time when international
human rights law has received considerable significance in two
other cases,2 2 the opportunity is presenting itself at a propitious
time to strengthen and accelerate juridical efforts to advocate the
cause of the right to privacy not only on the basis of domestic law,
but on the transnational norms as well. As demonstrated in Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson, international human rights law can find itself ap-
pearing through the channel of incorporation or as an interpretive
aid in the domestic law of a State like the United States.
In this country the use of transnational norms by domestic fo-
rums in human rights matters is currently experiencing a tremen-
dous upsurge.23 Historically, a manifest shift is visible from the
days of the famous case of Sei Fujii v. California in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court refused to accept that the Charter of the
United Nations, which is admittedly a treaty, could not be given
effect internally without corresponding domestic legislation.24 This
is the well known controversy about executing and non-self execut-
ing treaties and may not need further comment here. But in the last
few years the judiciary seems to be following, at least in some mat-
ters, a shift away from its earlier refusal to allow the flourishing of
22. See Filartiga x Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Filar-
tigal and Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), af'dsub. nom. Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson].
23. See generally Hassan, Panacea or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International
Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13, 32 (1981); Schneebaum, Interna-
tional Law as Guarantor of Judicially-Enforceable Rights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4
Hous. J. INT'L L. 65 (1981). See also Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to
Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39, 47 n.48 (1981).
24. Sei Fujii v. Cal., 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See also Article VI of the
United States Constitution, which contains the "supremacy clause" making treaties the
"supreme Law of the Land."
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international human rights in domestic controversies.25 If this is an
indication of a trend, one may have good grounds for hoping that
the threatened right to privacy in the domestic realm may have sup-
portive norms available from the domain of international human
rights law. Both cases where this has been recently done will ex-
hibit that notions of privacy of the individual can be juristically
supported by such a recourse. The sudden and unexpected support
for the right to privacy from such a quarter should be fully utilized
in the future, in addition to the traditional techniques applied for
this purpose in the past.
It is also hoped by this author that two important realizations
will emerge as a result of the ensuing discussion. First, the two
cases which we propose to deal with will signify that this right to
privacy is not only to be located in Article 12 of the Universal Dec-
laration, but in other international instruments as well. Conse-
quently, it will be contended that just as in the domestic United
States law where the right to privacy has been drawn from various
sources to cover diverse situations, similarly, from the international
field, we may be able to project zones ofprivacy by drawing on
different subjects protected by the international human rights law.
Second, it will be submitted that municipal courts and jurists ought
to take initiative to follow the modus vivendi adopted by these two
recent cases of locating the protection of this right in the diverse
norms of the international society forpossible use in domestic litiga-
tion. This process will invariably also add to the jurisprudence of
transnational human rights law on a subject, which as already
noted, is of increasing importance in both domestic and interna-
tional law.
III. A DIFFICULT PROBLEM
Before turning to an examination of the two cases in which
what is submitted above has been done, it is necessary to properly
25. Some of the well known cases in which courts refused to invoke international
human rights law are: e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525 (1949); American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S.
538 (1949); Boyer v. Garret, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950); Ruiz Alicia v. United States, 180
F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1950); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Keeney v. United
States, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954); South African Airways v. New York State Division of
Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S. 2d 651 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); New York Times
Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
aft'd, 49 App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1977); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Diggs v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 516 F.2d 1248
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
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comprehend the real dimensions of the problem articulated previ-
ously. Warren and Brandeis complained in 1890 that thoughts,
feelings and some very personal matters of an individual were
threatened by new advances in technology. We are faced with such
a threat today. Indeed, never before has this threat been more real
than in our own age. When the Universal Declaration was drafted
in 1948, something was known pertaining to what this right of pri-
vacy was meant to protect. But in the last three decades, the unbe-
lievable advances in science and technology have given totally new
significance to the potential of vehicles of encroachment, which has
increased the awareness of the need for such a protection. The in-
crease in the capacity of technological gadgets and computers, na-
tionally and internationally, has given both governments and big
institutions an enormous ability to know many things about an in-
dividual. In fact, it is no hyperbole to state that the information so
acquired constitutes most unbelievable power over the individual.
Whether the knowledge thus acquired is properly or improperly
used is less relevant than the awareness that the law must not allow
the individual to be placed at such a disadvantage. Knowledge
about the most personal and private aspects of a person's life, when
no crime has been committed by him, is something which free and
civilized societies never intended to be placed in the hands of any-
one except the individual concerned. If we allow this to happen, it
is undeniable that the freedom protected elsewhere will also be
threatened or actually impacted.
Alas, as a corollary to advances in science, the ordinary indi-
vidual has no alternative in his daily life but to rely, wittingly or
unwittingly, on the services and facilities of such a nature. As such,
he is bound to hand over many aspects of his most "personal" data
to machines which can be utilized in various ways. The use of this
knowledge need not be adverse to him. The harm is done even if
such personal matters become public knowledge.
Developments of this nature have occurred almost as a by-
product of this society's reliance on the help science has brought to
our existence. The international legal system is still, it is submitted,
not fully aware of what directions such matters are taking or may
eventually take.26
A look at the domestic situation with regard to this subject
may be helpful. If we look generally at the developments which
26. See supra notes 4-6.
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have occurred within the United States, it will be found that since
the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the courts have endeavored to
increase the protections available to the individual under the enu-
merated guarantees. But in the last three decades, many such juris-
tic human rights advances are under serious threat by the machines
which this society has come to utilize. Freedom of, or in our con-
text, the privacy of the individual is all but eroded if the State
desires to infringe upon such privacy. Both advanced countries
such as the United States and developing nations possess the means
to wiretap and bug anything they choose. This can occur domesti-
cally or internationally. Distance, in this respect, is meaningless.
Machines which can both hear and see are available on land, sea,
air and even in areas beyond this planet's atmosphere. Further-
more, many types of very personal information (specifically in
countries like the United States) become public knowledge the mo-
ment they appear on the tape of a computer (e.g., bank deposits,
buying, selling and other matters relating to such things as credit or
business undertakings). Concerns associated with crime prevention
have all but utterly taken away the inviolability of the home and
automobile.27 While this phenomenon should be considered bad
enough in countries like the United States, what can one speak of
many other countries where dictators of various ideologies hold
sway?
The extent to which information about individuals is being
collected today surpasses anything of this nature that has occurred
in the past. Not only the quantity, but the promptness with which it
can be utililzed, thanks to modem machines and computers, is a
serious blow to conceptions of freedom on which democratic socie-
ties are based. In a totalitarian society, at least ideologically, this
kind of extraordinary control over individuals is understandable
even if repugnant to liberal intellectual sensitivists. But to allow
this to happen simply as an incidence of a modem scientific era is
something to be deplored in those communities which pride them-
selves in being founded on considerations of freedom, equality and
individual initiative.
Perhaps a century ago, an individual, for most matters, had
control over all aspects of information about him, his home, his
name or his family. The excessive use of data and statistics in
27. For recent automobile cases see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976), Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), Robbins v. Cal., 453 U.S. 420 (1981), N. v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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nearly all domains of our existence, whether collected by the State
or commercial and private institutions, has utterly changed that
state of affairs. The passing of such information into the hands of
others is no longer a matter of volitional control of the individual
concerned. What an individual feels, does or thinks, for many im-
portant matters, is no longer guaranteed to remain secreted deep in
the place or institution where it was deposited or transmitted with
volition.
Since the dimensions of this problem do not stop at national
frontiers, it is necessary to argue for and create international pro-
tections. Internationally, therefore, privacy was not that much in
jeopardy in 1948 when the Universal Declaration was speaking of
it, as it is today. Given the international realities of the day (i.e., the
desire of both States and other multinational institutions to collect
as much data as possible on individuals they may have to deal
with), this author is not sure if anything at all can be done to negate
this trend. But, like in other areas of human rights, one simply has
to try.
IV. RECENT CASES
Having laconically identified the nature of the problem, we
can now turn to the two recent United States decisions in which,
while dealing with the cases of prisoners, the two courts utilized an
international instrument in one case to support the right to privacy,
and in the other to safeguard the "dignity" of the individual in ac-
cordance with standards of decency of civilized nations. The im-
portance of these cases, in the context of the theme of this Article,
lies in the fact that the courts, admittedly domestic, were able to
refer to, in addition to domestic law, international norms as an in-
dex of the desires of the international community. Moreover, the
particular source of such notions was said to be a text which is not
the Universal Declaration (which as already emphasized, does con-
tain specific acceptance of a right to privacy).
The two cases are Lareau v. Manson28 and Sterling v. Cupp.29
In both cases, the courts referred to the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations in
support of domestic law to conclude that certain types of indignities
could not be thrust upon the prisoners by the administration.
28. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Manson].
29. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Cupp].
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In Manson, the prisoners contended that (1) overcrowding vio-
lated their rights and, (2) they required protection from the chance
of being given communicable diseases by the failure of the officials
to properly medically screen new inmates. After analyzing relevant
laws, the court noted that its attention had been directed towards
the United Nation's Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners referred to above. After an examination of these rules the
court noted:
The adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules by the First
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treat-
ment of Offenders and its subsequent approval by the Economic
and Social Council does not necessarily render them applicable
here. However, these actions constitute an authoritative interna-
tional statement of basic norms of human dignity and of certain
practices which are repugnant to the conscience of mankind. The
standards embodied in this statement are relevant to the "canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice" em-
bodied in the Due Process Clause.30
In a later passage the court addressed the subject of standards of
human "decency" utilized by civilized nations by stating:
The "evolving standards of decency" with which the overcrowd-
ing of inmates at the HCCC are incompatible include the Stan-
dard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which
have been adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (the members of which include some nations whose
standards of decency and human rights are far less stringent than
our own) and thus form part of the body of international human
rights princples establishing standards for decent and humane con-
duct by all nations.
3 1
30. Manson, 507 F. Supp. at 1188.
31. Id. at 1192. The supporting note (18) to this citation may be quoted verbatim as it
stresses the relevant international human rights law on the varied facets of "decency."
The relevance of international norms such as the Standard Minimum Rules to the
determination of the "evolving standards of decency" which are basic to our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is underscored by Article 7 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" of individuals. The Covenant (which, in Article 7, paral-
lels the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution) is an international
treaty; although it has not been ratified by the United States Senate, it is not neces-
sarily without significance for this country (which signed it on October 5, 1977, see
U.S., Fu lling Promise, Signs 11- Year Old Rights Pacts at U.N., N.Y. Times, Oct 6,
1977, p. A2, col. 5), since "multilateral agreements designed for adherence by states
generally . . may come to be law for non-parties by virtue of state practice and
op'nio/uris resulting in customary law." Comment f to Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 102 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). Simi-
larly, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits "cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment." As the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently observed, the United Nations General Assembly "has de-
Vol. 13
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The court, thereafter, examined existing precedents and applicable
rules and granted both requests of the prisoners.
While this case does not speak directly for a right to privacy as
such, the thrust of the court's discussion is clearly aimed to stress
that when the space allocated to prisoners, already very limited, is
reduced through over-crowding, it offends the standards of decency
of civilized people. The court, as already emphasized, referred to
canons of fairness. Its reference to international instruments and
writings of international lawyers brought to focus the desire to
stress that at least some degree of protection of a person's personal
life (in this case of prisoners) finds support on a transnational
plane. The "zones" of privacy in this case were said to exist, inter
alia, in the international Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners. Admittedly, the court decided the case more on
the basis of available domestic law than by the application of inter-
national norms. The court did state, however, that certain obliga-
tions pertaining to human rights involving human secrecy were a
part of customary international law, and constituted the "expres-
sion" of the "international community. "32
clared that the [UN] Charter precepts embodied in the Universal Declaration [of
Human Rights] 'constitute basic principles of international law.'" Fiartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980), quoting G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24,
1970). The Universal Declaration is "'an authoritative statement of the interna-
tional community,' "id. at 883, quoting E. Schwelb, Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Community 70 (1964); which "creates an expectation of adherence, and
'insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may
by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States.'" Id.,
quoting 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn. 4/1/610 (1962) (mem-
orandum of Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat). As our Court of Appeals
noted in Filartiga, "several commentators have concluded that the Universal Decla-
ration has become, in too, a part of binding, customary international law." Id. See
Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations
Charter, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 110, 145-46 (1973); cf. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528
F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1193 n.18.
32. Inter alia note 9 states:
Apart from Connecticut's administrative adoption of the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, those standards may be significant
as expressions of the obligations to the international community of the member
states of the United Nations, cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir.
1980), and as part of the body of international law (including customary interna-
tional law) concerning human rights which has been built upon the foundation of
the United Nations Charter. See generally Buergenthal, Codification and Implemen-
tation ofInternational Human Rights 15-19 in Human Dignity: The International-
ization of Human Rights (A. Henkin ed. 1978). It is well established that
customary international law is part of the law of the United States. See, e.g., The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900); L. Hen-
kin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 221 (1972). The United Nations Charter
is, of course, a treaty ratified by the United States. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993
(1945). Although not self-executing, see Hitai v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv-
ice, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965), the Charter's provisions on human rights are
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It is thus submitted that such a highly progressive attitude of a
domestic court by which it argued for canons of dignity and fair-
ness, which individuals must possess in a civilized society by virtue
of transnational instruments, deserves our highest appreciation.33
The reference to concepts of "dignity" and "fairness," which some
may term more philosophic and idealistic than real law, emphasizes
the apparently limitless potential of this right as well as its moral
content.3 4 It is perhaps a manifestation of an awareness that no-
tions of a person's "dignity" are not really esoteric or platonic, but
are desirable practical ends to be accomplished or safeguarded
through positive law. Domestically, the courts in the United States,
as previously noted, had done so in many areas, such as the sanctity
of a married persons life, 35 but by the aid of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights. On the other hand, in Manson, the same type of
attitude of the court is discernible for providing some protection to
persons in the judicial custody of a State, by reference not merely to
domestic law, but also by calling into aid the aspirations of the in-
ternational society on this point.
The facts of Cupp were more unusual. In that case, male pris-
evidence of principles of customary international law recognized as part of the law
of the United States. See Fiartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra 630 F. 2d at 881-82 & n.9;
see general/l United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974); Restate-
ment of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) §§ 102(l)(b),
102(3), 131 & Comment h to § 102 (Tent. Draft. No. 1, 1980). Article 55 of the
Charter provides that the United Nations shall promote the observance of human
rights; in Article 56 the member states pledge "to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement" of the goals of Article 55;
and Article 62(2) of the Charter authorizes the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."
Id. at 1188 n.9.
33. See supra note 30.
34. Some authors, like Professor Watson, however, argue that human rights and inter-
national law do not have much connection. "Advocacy on the part of scholars in the area of
human rights has replaced serious study to such an extent that law and wishful thinking are
inextricably interwined. The result-an attractive, if futile, philanthropy." See Watson, Le-
gal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development ofHuman Rights Norms in International
Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609, 614 (1979).
35. In Griswold, the Court remarked:
And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in
light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288, 307, .
• . . Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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oners requested the prohibition of body searches or frisking by fe-
male employees. The constitutional premise for the protection they
sought was based on the Oregon State and United States Constitu-
tion. The court of appeals granted the relief sought by the plaintiffs
by agreeing that the prisoner's "right of privacy" was infringed
upon by this practice.36 The court of appeals was aware of the im-
port of Griswold, but added in a footnote that the source of this
right was not altogether clear.37 In an excellent judgment, Justice
Linde in the supreme court on the state's appeal noted that it was
not an easy matter (for any court) to ascertain what precisely this
right might or could cover. He said:
That the court found "privacy" a difficult premise for decision is
not surprising. When a single term is stretched to reach from a
civil claim against undesired disclosure or publicity, see Prosser,
Law of Torts 802 (4th ed 1971); White, Tort Law in America
173-176 (1980), by way of a constitutional barrier against gov-
ernment intrusion into activities normally conducted in private,
see Grisowid v. Connecticut, supra, (marital use of contracep-
tives), and a privilege to engage at home in conduct forbidden
elsewhere, see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (use of
marijuana at home), cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct.
1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (possession of pornography at
home), to claims of personal autonomy in choices of conduct, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct.705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)
(abortion) and choices of domestic associations, see City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal.Rptr.
539 (1980)(residential "family" of unrelated individuals), the law
is bound to pay a price in clarity and cogency. One may pause at
the delegation to courts implicit in adopting such a protean and
36. Cupp, 44 Or.App. at 758, 607 P.2d at 209.
37. Justice Linde, after noting the quintessence of the view of the dissenting members of
the court of appeals, stated interestingly:
If the "right of privacy" lacks a "principled explanation," it is not for lack of at-
tempts. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-686,
97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); Tribe, American Constitutional Law 886-889
and sources there cited; cf. Kurland, The Private 1, Univ. Chi. Mag. 7 (1976),
quoted in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876 n.24, 51 L.Ed.2d
64 (1977).
Inquiry into a distinctive meaning for "privacy," stimulated by Griswold and
its sequels, has been similarly inconclusive among philosophers. See, e. g., Thomp-
son, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil. & Pub.Aff. 295 (1975)(concluding that no right in
the "privacy cluster" is not covered by some other "cluster" of rights), and re-
sponses by Scanlon, 4 Phil. & Pub.Aft. at 315, and Rachels, 4 Phil. & Pub.Aff. at
323; Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.JnI. 475 (1968) and Fried, Privacy.- Economics and
Ethics, 4 Comment on Posner, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 423 (1978); Huff, Thinking Clearly
About Privacy, 55 Wash.L.Rev. 777 (1980). See also NOMOS XIII: Privacy
(1971).
Cupp, 625 P.2d at 127 n.3.
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emotive term as a test of the validity of laws. "A concept in dan-
ger of embracing everything is a concept in danger of conveying
nothing." Tribe, American Constitutional Law 888-889 (1976).38
Justice Linde went on to consider the relevant constitutional provi-
sions of both the state and Federal Constitution, particularly those
dealing with punishment, to stress that the law did envisage a guar-
antee of "humane treatment" for those in the state's custody.39
While the case was ultimately decided on domestic law, the court
importantly said:
It may well be that the interest asserted by the prisoners in this
case can be brought within one of the kinds of "privacy" said to
be protected by unexpressed penumbras of the United States
Constitution. See Gunther v. Iowa State's Men's Reform, 612
F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980) cert. den. 446 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 2942, 64
L.Ed.2d 825 (1980). 40
The court also noted:
Indeed, the same principles have been a worldwide concern recog-
nized by the United Nations and other multinational bodies. The
various formulations in these different sources in themselves are
not constitutional law. We cite them here as contemporary ex-
pressions of the same concern with minimizing needlessly harsh,
degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of prisoners that is ex-
pressed in article I, section 13. 4 1
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id. at 127-29.
40. Id. at 129. Subsequently, while dealing with applicable domestic rules, the court
stressed the need to maintain the dignity and integrity of the prisoners. Id. at 130.
41. Id at 131 (emphasis added). Note twenty-one, where this discussion takes place,
may be reproduced verbatim with advantage:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed "as a common standard
of achievement" under the directive to "promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of human rights" in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, states in
Article 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." (Emphasis added). In the later International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, this principle is repeated in Part III, Article 7 and
further spelled out and expanded in Part III, Article 10:
"1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respectfr the inherent dignity of the human person.
"2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segre-
gated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment
appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and
brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.
"3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the es-
sential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.
Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treat-
ment appropriate to their age and legal status." (Emphasis added).
The formulation of the Universal Declaration is used in Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. [Eu-
ropean] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
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Having concluded that privacy included the maintenance of
the individual's "dignity" and integrity, the court went out of its
way to point out that, in essence, these principles had been recog-
nized by the United Nations when proclaiming the Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
A. Functional Use
It will thus be apparent from the United States cases discussed
above that the right to privacy has been functionally helpful in
many diverse situations. Since in the domestic field, the right, as
such, does not find any mention in the United States Constitution,
its deployment is, as far as precedent is concerned, entirely a judi-
cial creation. It fully exhibits in this author's submission the liberal
or progressive trait which distinguishes a civilized system of law.
It would also be apparent from the references mentioned
hithertofore, both by this author and others who have been quoted,
that the subject has received in the past a fairly extensive coverage
in the domain of constitutional and criminal law. But despite this
coverage by the courts and writers for more than a century, we are
no more nearer to finding the extent to which it might be used.
Nevertheless, the vast diversity of situations in which it has been
mentioned to provide a remedy is very encouraging. It gives us
good grounds for stating that the great functional advantage of
having an undefined right to privacy lies in its elasticity.
doms, art. 3, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered intoforce Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T. 222. It
was applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kindgom,
judgment of Jan. 18, 1978 Series A no. 25 reprinted in 17 Int'l Legal Materials 680
(1978) (detention and interrogation practices held violative of art. 3). In the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights the same formulation is followed by the sen-
tence "All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person." American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 5, § 2, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, 36 OAS Treaty
Series 1, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2. The Standard Minimum
Rulesfor the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the First United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955 and approved
by the Economic and Social Council in 1957 (Resolution 663C (XXIV) provide for
the separation of male and female prisoners (Rule 8(a), and for minimizing condi-
tions "which tend to lessen the responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to
their dignity as human beings." (Rule 60(1).) Contained in the Report on the First
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers (U.N.Pub., No.: 1956. IV.4), reproduced in Compendium of Model Correctional
Legislation and Standards at Compendium IV-10, IV-13 (American Bar Associa-
tion and Council of State Governments, 1972). This expression of the United Na-
tions in turn had antecedents in the League of Nations. See S. Rubin, The Law of
Criminal Correction 286 n.7 (1963).
The history of these standards and their application is reviewed in Skoler,
World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rulesfor Treatment
of Prisoners, 10 Jnl.Int.L.&Econ. 453 (1975).
Id. at 131 n.21.
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This brings us back to the fundamental point of this matter.
The need to use this right today is not only urgent, but is also one in
which only a concept as flexible as this one may be of some help.
As it was indicated, human privacy, unknowingly to the individual,
is being taken away by the use of sophisticated machines. Inch by
inch, personal information and data, and private thoughts and de-
liberations, are falling into the hands of governments, corporations,
or in some cases, the ordinary public at large. Only the imaginative
use of this prerogative can prevent a mass erosion of such cherished
human concerns.
The importance and relevance of using international instru-
ments to strengthen the right to privacy lies in the fact that unlike,
for example, the United States Constitution, this right of privacy is
directly acknowledged by the most famous of modem human rights
documents-the Universal Declaration. Furthermore, numerous
other international texts refer to "dignity" and cherished values of
mankind.42 As such, there may exist sufficient international mate-
rial, broadly dealing with this subject, which can be beneficially
used in accelerating the movement of protecting this right domesti-
cally by reference to internationally proclaimed values.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The relevance of creating an international concern in this re-
gard is obvious. As already pointed out, the dimensions of inva-
sions of an individual's privacy do not end with national
boundaries. The use of machines to pry on and collect data con-
cerning an individual is as evident in the international field as it is
domestically. An individual needs the kind of protection outlined
above transnationally as much as within the territory of a State.
A mere abundance of liberal thought on this subject is not
enough to win a battle of this nature. While commercial interests
will fight to protect the information thus acquired or which may be
acquired over the individual (who may be an employee or a com-
petitor), the governments will have other types of concerns, such as
national security or crime prevention, which will not allow for the
eventual implementation of this right which is expressly referred to
by the Universal Declaration. Since States have to devise new in-
ternational norms, there is not a strong possibility that appropriate
42. See, e.g., UNESCO, Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted by the Gen-
eral Conference at its twentieth session Paris, 27 November 1978, Preamble, Article 9. See
also supra note 41.
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international enforcement legislation may be readily forthcoming.
From the above discussion, however, this much is clear: even if
more international legislation is slow to come, or does not come at
all (an awareness of equal validity in the domestic scene on this
matter), we can still solve this problem, even if partially, through
the use by domestic forums of international human rights law as
demonstrated by cases like Cupp, Filartiga and Wilkinson. Further-
more, as evidenced by the later two cases which have received ex-
tended periodical comment, the doctrine of incorporation may be
available to allow courts to draw upon international instruments to
strengthen or clarify the right to privacy in domestic
controversies.
43
One salvation, therefore, of the endangered right to privacy
lies in the innovative use by domestic courts, of not only national
precedents but also international sources, to create zones ofprivacy
for the individual by the interpretation of existing international
texts. The undefined limits of this right, both nationally and inter-
nationally, will provide its greatest asset. By emphasizing concepts
of "dignity," "decency" and "fairness," much more can be accom-
plished than by the most erudite definition which may juristically
be given to this right. It is, in a way, ironical. Whereas in most
cases, the law is better off when known with precision, here is a case
when the contrary will prove more helpful.
The major conclusions of this short account about the use by
domestic forums of the right to privacy as found in international
texts may be said to be the threat to privacy-not merely as a na-
tional problem, but as an international problem. Since, unlike ma-
jor national constitutions, a leading international instrument
directly refers to such a right, innovative use can be made of such a
text to aid this matter nationally as well as internationally. Indeed,
use can also be made of other international documents to find more
support to develop its content. 44 For the present, domestic enforce-
43. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980) and Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981). See also Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53
(1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Law as the Rule ofDecision, 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 504 (1981); Case Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law Fi-
lartiga v. Peha-lrala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353 (1981). For the present author's view, see Has-
san, supra note 23, at 32.
44. It is also interesting to note that while using the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, the Manson court emphasized notions of "decency" and "fairness,"
while the Cupp court focused on conceptions of privacy.
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ment seems to be the best method to further this particular part of
the international human rights law.
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